The Sokoto airstrikes are not just about security.
A decisive moment and its immediate reactions
In the last week of December 2025, news broke that the United States, working in coordination with the Nigerian government, had carried out airstrikes on Islamic State hideouts in Sokoto State. The operation was decisive and highly symbolic, and for that reason alone, it was impossible to ignore.
Across the country, reactions were mixed, but they were not confused.
Missile launch during the Sokoto airstrike (Unclassified DoD footage(. Source: Reuters, “U.S.-backed airstrikes in Nigeria hit two ISIS-linked camps, government says” Reuters, 27 Dec 2025.
For many Nigerians, particularly those who have lived for years under the shadow of terrorism, banditry, and persistent insecurity, the strikes were received with relief. In a context where state response has often felt slow or ineffective, the intervention appeared decisive in a way that had been long absent. There was gratitude, not necessarily because a foreign power was involved, but because something tangible had finally happened. Beyond the immediate military outcome, the message mattered. Terrorist groups were not untouchable, and violence did not go unanswered.
At the same time, other Nigerians responded with caution rather than celebration. Their reaction was not driven by opposition to the outcome itself, but by unease about what the event represented. Questions surfaced quietly, often beneath the louder expressions of relief. What interests were at play. What precedents were being set. What it means, in structural terms, when a foreign power conducts military operations on Nigerian soil, even with the consent of the Nigerian state.
These responses are often presented as competing positions, but that framing misses something important. It is entirely possible to hold both reactions at once.
One can acknowledge the significance of a strong counterterrorism signal while also recognising that events like this do not exist in isolation. They sit within a much longer history of foreign involvement in developing countries, a history that is rarely straightforward and almost never purely charitable.
This is where geopolitics complicates the picture.
Geopolitics, Interests, and the nature of Soft Power
In international relations, states do not act on goodwill alone. They act in pursuit of interests, even when those interests overlap with those of others. Soft power is often the preferred instrument because it is subtle, legitimate, and difficult to contest. It operates through security cooperation, development assistance, financial support, technical expertise, and institutional reform. Because it does not arrive through force, it is frequently interpreted as neutral or benevolent.
However, influence does not need to be hostile to be consequential.
Foreign involvement can be simultaneously beneficial and constraining. It can address immediate crises while reshaping long-term power dynamics. It can strengthen capacity in one area while narrowing autonomy in another. These tensions are not contradictions. They are features of how influence actually works.
What Nigeria’s economic history reveals about external support
Nigeria has encountered this dynamic before, most visibly in the economic sphere. In the 1980s, under severe fiscal pressure, the country entered into Structural Adjustment Programmes promoted by international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. These programmes were framed as stabilisation measures and, in some respects, they responded to real economic challenges. At the same time, they redefined the role of the state, compressed public spending, weakened domestic industry, and constrained policy choice well beyond the period of immediate crisis. The long-term social and institutional consequences remain part of Nigeria’s lived reality.
The relevance of this history is not sentimental. External support often arrives with frameworks, assumptions, and priorities embedded within it. Over time, those frameworks shape what governments come to regard as feasible, responsible, or unavoidable. Policy space is not removed abruptly. It is gradually narrowed through alignment.
Security cooperation follows a similar logic.
Sovereignty, Capacity, and the Long-Term Cost of Dependence
When a powerful state brings intelligence capabilities, surveillance assets, and military reach into a local security context, it inevitably shapes how threats are understood and how responses are prioritised. Certain risks become more visible. Certain solutions gain legitimacy. Certain timelines are accelerated. This does not mean that the host country loses all agency, but it does mean that agency is exercised within a more constrained field.
For developing countries, this constraint carries particular weight. Weak internal coordination, fragmented institutions, and resource limitations make it harder to engage from a position of clarity. Partnerships are often formed reactively, in response to crisis, rather than strategically, as part of a long-term national design. Over time, decisions taken in isolation accumulate into structural dependence.
This is where the conversation usually stops, and where it needs to deepen.
The question is not whether Nigeria should cooperate with foreign powers. It must. Terrorism is transnational, financial systems are global, and technology does not respect borders. Rather, the more difficult question is whether Nigeria has built the internal architecture required to ensure that cooperation reinforces sovereignty rather than slowly displacing it.
Sovereignty, in this sense, is not about isolation or resistance. It is about capacity. The capacity to engage without being absorbed, to receive support without surrendering control, and to define national priorities clearly enough that external actors align with them rather than overwrite them.
Without that clarity, even well-intentioned interventions can produce long-term dependencies. Military cooperation can substitute for domestic security reform. Development aid can replace sustained state investment. Financial support can become a permanent crutch rather than a temporary bridge. Over time, policy space shrinks not because it was seized, but because it was never sufficiently protected.
Seen in this light, the Sokoto airstrikes matter not only because of what they achieved tactically, but because of what they reveal structurally. They expose both the benefits of partnership and the costs of institutional weakness. They force difficult questions about who defines urgency, who sets terms, and how much room remains for independent decision-making.
This is not an argument against action. It is an argument against simplification.
The Questions That Remain
Developing countries are not passive victims of imperialism, but neither are they operating on a level playing field. Power operates through incentives, institutions, and narratives as much as through force. Recognising this does not make one cynical or ungrateful. It makes one attentive.
If Nigeria is to navigate an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment, it will need more than allies. It will need coherence. Strong internal coordination. Clearly articulated national interests. Institutions capable of absorbing external support without becoming dependent on it.
Otherwise, moments of relief will continue to coexist with long-term vulnerability, and decisive actions will raise as many questions as they answer.